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I. Introduction 
The Obama Administration’s (Adminstration) mandate 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 that 
nearly all employers cover certain contraceptive drugs and 
devices in any employee health plan (the Mandate)2 opened a new 
front in the American abortion debate. Religious objectors charge 
that coverage of six specific “abortion-inducing”3 drugs and 
                                                                                                     
 1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended at scattered sections of the Internal 
Revenue Code and at 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 through May 1, 
2010. 
 2. The ACA requires coverage “with respect to women, [of] such additional 
preventive care and screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in 
comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (‘HRSA’) for purposes of this paragraph.” See Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 1001 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 300GG-13(a)(4) (2010)). The HRSA Guidelines recommended 
coverage of “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive 
methods [and] sterilization procedures.” See Women’s Preventive Services 
Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands Prevention Coverage for Women’s 
Health and Well-Being, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hrsa. gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). Relying on the HRSA Guidelines, the 
Administration finalized rules requiring coverage of “preventive care . . . 
provided for in comprehensive guidelines supported by HRSA.” Interim Final 
Rule on Preventive Services Under the ACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46621, 46623 (Aug. 3, 
2011); Final Rule on Preventive Services under the ACA, 77 Fed. Reg. 8724, 
8725 (Feb. 15, 2012). The Mandate does not include drugs that are known to 
work after implantation as chemical abortions, like RU-486. RU-486 is 
marketed under the tradename “Korlym” and “Mifeprex.” Orange Book: 
Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN. (2013), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/Cder/ob/docs/temptn. 
cfm (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
For a synopsis of the Administration’s accommodations of religious non-profits, 
see Robin Fretwell Wilson, Demagoguing Abortion (working title), in THE 
RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (Zoe Robinson, Micah Schwartzman & Chad 
Flanders eds., forthcoming 2014) (on file with author). For penalties imposed on 
objecting, non-exempt, for-profit employers if they drop all coverage, see Robin 
Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, 
Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. 
L. REV. 1417, 1489–1505 (2012) [hereinafter Wilson, The Calculus]. 
 3. Complaint at 6, Wheaton Coll. v. Sebelius, 887 F. Supp. 2d. 102 (D.D.C. 
July 18, 2012) (No. 1:12CV01169), http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2012/07/Wheaton-Complaint-timestamped.pdf; see also Birth Control: 
Medicines to Help You, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/ 
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devices is tantamount to providing an “abortion on demand.”4 The 
Administration and Mandate supporters insist that “drugs that 
cause abortion are not covered by [the Mandate].”5 This firestorm 
over such drugs and devices (together, emergency contraceptives 
or EC) reverberates far outside the Washington Beltway, spilling 
over to decisions facing women about whether to use EC after 
“unanticipated sexual activity, contraceptive failure, or sexual 
assault.”6 
This Article explores how it is possible that such wildly 
different claims can be made about the same drugs and devices, 
claims that create real confusion for real women who are deciding 
whether to use EC. It shows that both sides—Mandate 
supporters and opponents, family planning advocates and 
opponents of abortion—use conclusory labels to shorthand an 
extraordinarily complex and still-unfolding scientific 
understanding about how different kinds of EC work. 
Notwithstanding key differences in their mechanisms of action—
that is, how the drug acts in a woman’s body—supporters and 
opponents alike lump all EC together as if they work by precisely 
the same mechanism, glossing over important differences.7 
                                                                                                     
byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.htm (last updated May 2013) 
(last visited Feb. 11, 2014) [hereinafter FDA Birth Control Guide] (describing 
various types of birth control, their utility, and how they work) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. Complaint at 7, Sharpe Holding v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health and Human 
Servs., (E.D. Mo. 2012) (No. 2:12-CV-92), http://www.becketfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Sharpe-Holdings-complaint.pdf; see also Timothy 
Dolan, HHS Contraception Mandate “Un-American”, USA TODAY (Jan. 25, 2012, 
2:04 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/opinion/ forum/story/2012-01-
25/dolan-hhs-health-contraceptive-mandate/52788780/1 (last visited Jan. 14, 
2014) (“[T]he contraceptives mandated as ‘preventive services’ will include 
abortifacients.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 5. Cecila Munoz, Health Reform, Preventative Services, and Religious 
Institutions, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012, 6:35PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/02/01/health-reform-preventive-services-
and-religious-institutions (last visited Jan. 14, 2014) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). The Administration has consistently 
maintained that the Mandate does “not include abortifacient drugs.” See infra 
note 36 and accompanying text. 
 6. WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MEDICAL 
ABORTION AND EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE PILLS, ASS’N OF REPROD. HEALTH 
PROF’LS 1 (Dec. 2010), http://www.arhp.org/uploadDocs/mifepristone_ecfact 
sheet.pdf [hereinafter WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW]. 
 7. See infra Part III.A and accompanying footnotes (discussing the 
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Compounding the competing explanations about how EC 
works is the fact that both sides mean very different things when 
they claim something is or is not “abortion-causing.”8 Mandate 
supporters contend that pregnancy begins when “a pre-embryo 
completes implantation,”9 while objectors believe the “life of every 
human being [begins at] the moment of conception/fertilization,”10 
making its destruction “the killing of an innocent person.”11  
For women contemplating EC, separating “fact from fiction” 
is no easy task12: “Since the approval of [ella] . . . there has been 
even more confusion and controversy.”13 Precisely because of 
“myths” swirling around “in the popular press and on the 
internet,” some women are now asking “tough questions about 
mechanisms of action.”14  
While some discount concerns about whether EC works after 
fertilization as a form of “zygote worship”15 shared only by 
                                                                                                     
different likely mechanisms of action for Plan B and ella and how they affect the 
female reproductive system). 
 8. See infra Part II (discussing the confusion over what is and is not an 
abortion-causing drug). 
 9. What You Need to Know, supra note 6, at 1.  
 10. Complaint at 2, 9, 11–13, Tyndale House Publishers v. Sebelius, 
(D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2013) (No. 1:12-CV-1635-RBW), http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ 
TyndaleComplaint.pdf. 
 11. Verified Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 3, QC Group, 
Inc. v. Sebelius, (D. Minn. July 2, 2013) (No. 0:13-CV-01726), http://www. 
becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/1-Verified-Complaint-for-Declara 
tory-and-Injunctive-Relief-7-2-13.pdf. Like many Catholic groups that have sued 
the Administration, QC also believes that:  
God, the Creator of human life, does not condone the use of birth 
control (which includes ella, Plan B, the Pill, and other forms of 
contraceptive required by the HHS Mandate) in any form because 
they interfere with God’s sovereign will regarding whether and when 
human beings should be born.  
Id. As one of the authors notes elsewhere, few Americans object to contraceptive 
use. See Wilson, The Calculus, supra note 2, at 1454 n.134 (citing a CBS News 
opinion poll). 
 12. Pelin Batur, Emergency contraception: Separating fact from fiction, 79 
CLEVELAND CLINIC J. OF MED. 771, 771 (2012), available at 
http://www.ccjm.org/content/79/11/771.full.pdf+html.  
 13. See id. (identifying and explaining common misunderstandings about 
ella).  
 14. Id. at 771, 774. 
 15. I am indebted to Professor Jacqueline R. Fox, University of South 
Carolina, School of Law, for bringing this term to my attention at the August 
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religious zealots, many women of child-bearing age remain torn 
over using EC.16 For some, these qualms flow directly from their 
belief that life begins at fertilization. Although not an universally 
held view, deeply personal views about the beginning of life raise 
the question: Shouldn’t doctors have an “open and honest 
conversation[ ] in layman’s terms regarding EC, its benefits, and 
its potential consequences and let the patient make her own 
decision”?17  
This Article maintains that a physician’s “guidance on how 
and when to use [EC]”18 is necessary to equip women with the 
information needed to make informed decisions about their bodies 
and healthcare, guided by “their own moral or religious beliefs.”19 
Part II briefly recaps how the Mandate reinvigorated public 
concerns about abortion. It shows that religious objectors lifted 
their concerns about the contested drugs and devices directly 
from each label approved by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA)—as the Administration concedes in the litigation over the 
                                                                                                     
2013 Southeastern Association of Law Schools conference. 
 16. See infra Part IV (discussing the ethical dilemma women often face in 
deciding whether to use EC). 
 17. Jennifer L. Wallace, et al., Letters to the Editor, In Response, Does 
Pregnancy Begin at Fertilization?, Author’s Response, 36 FAM. MED. 690, 691 
(2004), http://www.stfm.org/fmhub/fm2004/November/Walter690.pdf. 
 18. Batur, supra note 12, at 771. Plan B’s accessibility on the shelf presents 
added complexity to this issue. See infra note 66 (discussing the availability of 
Plan B without a prescription or required interaction with a pharmacist). Thus, 
women may not consult a physician or other professional before taking Plan B. 
Therefore, the drug’s label should reflect accurate, accessible, and up-to-date 
information regarding the drug’s mechanism of action. See infra Part III 
(discussing fourteen years of scientific evidence that Plan B does not act after 
fertilization, despite disclosures on Plan B’s label). Furthermore, primary care 
physicians may also want to inform women seeking contraceptives about how 
specific kinds of EC work. 
 19. Charles J. Lockwood, OTC Emergency Contraception: The Right Choice, 
49 CONTEMP. OB/GYN 12, 15 (2004). Other healthcare professionals, such as 
pharmacists, also have a role to play in providing women with the necessary 
information to make informed decisions regarding EC use. See generally 
EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION, EMERGENCY 
CONTRACEPTION GUIDELINES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES (2014), 
http://www.ec-ec.org/custom-content/uploads/2014/03/ECEC_EC-Guidelines-in-
EU-countries_Feb2014.pdf. Therefore, while this Article deals primarily with 
informed consent law as applied to physicians, informed consent principles 
should animate the responsibilities of other healthcare professionals as well.  
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Mandate presently before the U.S. Supreme Court.20 Part III then 
assesses the conflicting claims made by both sides about how the 
contested drugs and devices actually work, focusing on two: Plan 
B and ella.21 This Part shows that since Plan B’s approval in 
1999, it has never been shown to work after fertilization—despite 
statements on its own label.22 By contrast, ella is believed to 
“have an additional action of affecting the ability of the embryo to 
either attach to the endometrium or maintain its attachment, by 
a variety of mechanisms” after fertilization.23 As Part IV 
documents, significant numbers of women care deeply about 
whether a given drug acts after fertilization to prevent or disrupt 
implantation.24  
Part V turns to the two prevailing standards for determining 
what patients should be told when providing fully informed 
consent to a treatment—the professional standard and the 
material risk standard. This Part concludes that under either 
standard, doctors have a duty to help women decipher the dense, 
technical explanations found on the FDA-approved labels if 
women are to make informed decisions to use EC guided by their 
own values.25 In doing so, physicians can add much-needed clarity 
to an issue muddied by political rancor, while enhancing the 
autonomy of the very women the Mandate sought to empower 
and assist.26 
                                                                                                     
 20. See infra Parts II and III; Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, supra 
note 3 (explaining various types of birth control).  
 21. See infra Part III.A (detailing how Plan B and ella work). 
 22. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (comparing the drug 
labels of ella and Plan B); infra Part III.A.1 (discussing when and how Plan B 
works).  
 23. Batur, supra note 12, at 774; see also Part III.A.2. 
 24. See infra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra Part V. 
 26. See Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordance Care 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 
29 C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156) (“[B]oth existing health 
coverage and existing preventive services recommendations often did not 
adequately serve the unique health needs of women. This disparity placed 
women in the workforce at a disadvantage . . . . [A]ccess to contraception 
improves the social and economic status of women.”). 
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II. A Resurgent Abortion Debate 
In the years before the Mandate entered the public psyche, 
reporting about “abortion-inducing drugs” was minimal.27 As 
Figure 1 illustrates, after the Administration promulgated rules 
requiring coverage of “all-FDA approved contraceptives” in 
August 2011,28 news reports about “abortion-inducing,” 
“abortifacient,” and “abortion-causing” drugs spiked and brought 
this concern fully into the American consciousness. 29  
                                                                                                     
 27. Prior to the Mandate, it was healthcare providers who principally 
asserted religious objections to EC. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Limits of 
Conscience: Moral Clashes over Deeply Divisive Health Care Procedures, 34 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 41, 52–54 (2008) [hereinafter The Limits] (discussing refusals from 
healthcare facilities to perform abortions and prescribe EC, which resulted in 
the development of a private clinic industry); Robin Fretwell Wilson, The 
Erupting Clash Between Religion and the State Over Contraception, 
Sterilization, and Abortion, in RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA: CONSTITUTIONAL 
ROOTS AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES (Allen D. Hertzke, ed., Univ. of Okla. 
Press 2014) (forthcoming) (discussing recent clashes over providing EC and 
abortions by nurses at two major medical centers); see also GUTTMACHER 
INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES 3 
(Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf 
(charting “policies allowing providers to refuse” to provide abortion, 
contraception, and sterilization).  
 28. See supra note 2 (charting the evolution of the regulations requiring 
expanded coverage in accordance with HRSA Guidelines). 
 29. Three “All News” searches on Lexis for U.S. news pieces containing the 
terms “abortion-inducing,” “abortifacient,” or “abortion-causing” are telling:  















































“abortion-inducing” 43 73 31 8 20 3 46 33 6 5 12 20 125 1193 1225 
“abortifacient” 36 30 34 26 22 30 79 116 49 64 64 56 143 816 428 
“abortion-causing” 6 5 5 1 7 2 16 12 11 6 11 14 28 125 91 
TOTAL 85 108 70 35 49 35 141 161 66 75 87 90 296 2134 1744 
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Reporters quickly spotlighted the controversy. Headlines 
routinely touted one perspective or another: “Obamacare 
Mandates (Free) Coverage of Abortion Drug”30 and “Emergency 
Contraception Is Not Abortion.”31  
Mandate supporters and opponents staked out opposing, 
public positions. In “Six Things Everyone Should Know About the 
HHS [Department of Health and Human Services] Mandate,” the 
United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, a Mandate 
opponent, forcefully asserted: “[B]y including all drugs approved 
by the FDA for use as contraceptives, the HHS mandate includes 
drugs that can induce abortion, such as ‘ella,’ a close cousin of the 
abortion pill RU-486.”32 Supporters, like the American Congress 
                                                                                                     
 30. See Jeffrey Anderson, Obamacare Mandates (Free) Coverage of Abortion 
Drug, THE WEEKLY STANDARD: THE BLOG (Aug. 4, 2011, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/obamacare-mandates-coverage-abortion-
drug_581969.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) (criticizing the Mandate) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. See Amanda Marcotte, Emergency Contraception Is Not Abortion, 
SLATE: THE XX FACTOR (June 6, 2012, 12:53 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/ 
xx_factor/2012/06/06/the_new_york_times_confirms_that_emergency_contracept
ion_only_works_by_suppressing_ovulation_.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2014) 
(discussing a recent New York Times article on EC) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 32. Six Things Everyone Should Know About the Health and Human 
Services Mandate, U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (Feb. 6, 2012), 







Figure 1. Reporting About  
"Abortion-Inducing" Drugs by Year 
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of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, came to the Mandate’s 
defense: “Abortion coverage is not required to be part of a 
minimum benefits package, and no federal funds or tax credits 
may be used to pay for abortions, except for abortions in case of 
rape, incest, and when the pregnancy puts the mother’s life in 
danger.”33  
Although the better news reports and public statements 
unpacked exactly what they meant by “abortifacient” or 
“abortion-causing drug,”34 many did not.35 Even the 
Administration could have shed more light than it did. An HHS-
drafted Factsheet about the Mandate flatly declared that 
“[a]bortifacient drugs are not included.”36 After exempting 
nonprofit religious objectors, the Administration continued to 
                                                                                                     
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. AM. CONG. OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, ACOG’S HEALTH 
CARE REFORM FAQS FOR WOMEN 1–2 (May 2010), available at 
http://www.acog.org/~/media/Departments/Health%20Care%20Reform/201005H
CRFAQsForWomen.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20131211T1254164769. The American 
Congress and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists are 
companion entities. Id. 
 34. See Marcotte, supra note 31 (“[A]bortion terminates pregnancy, which 
begins at implantation.”); Anderson, supra note 30 (stating that abortifacients 
work by “by keeping a fertilized egg (or a newly conceived being) from 
implanting in the uterine wall”); Six Things Everyone Should Know, supra note 
32 (noting that the HHS Mandate included coverage of ella, which the 
Conference considered to be an abortion-inducing drug). 
 35. See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Obama Revises Mandate: Free Abortion-
Causing Drugs for Women, LIFENEWS.COM (Feb. 20, 2012, 12:55 PM), 
http://www.lifenews.com/2012/02/10/obama-revises-mandate-free-abortion-
causing-drugs-for-women/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (“The Obama 
administration has revised its controversial mandate that had forced religious 
employers to pay for health insurance coverage that includes birth control and 
drugs like Plan B, the morning after pill, and ella that can cause abortions.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Paige Winfield Cunningham, 
White House: Insurers Must Cover Abortion Pill, THE WASH. TIMES (Aug. 1, 
2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/aug/1/white-house-insurers-
must-cover-abortion-pill/?page=all (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (failing to define 
“abortion” in distinguishing required coverage of Plan B, but not RU-486) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 36. Factsheet: Affordable Care Act Rules on Expanding Access to Preventive 
Services for Women, on file with the author. HHS appears to have taken down 
the Factsheet, but a search now leads to this: Affordable Care Act Rules on 
Expanding Access to Preventive Services for Women, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/factsheets/2011/08/womens 
prevention08012011a.html (last updated Jun. 2013) (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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summarily dismiss concerns that mandated drugs in fact cause 
abortions: “[T]he regulations do not violate federal restrictions 
relating to abortion because FDA-approved methods, including 
Plan B, ella, and IUDs, are not abortifacients within the meaning 
of federal law.”37 
Ironically, the FDA labels for each contested drug supplied 
the basis for objectors’ concerns. The label for Plan B One-Step 
reads:  
Emergency contraceptive pills are not effective if a woman is 
already pregnant. Plan B One-Step is believed to act as an 
emergency contraceptive principally by preventing ovulation 
or fertilization (by altering tubal transport of sperm and/or 
ova). In addition, it may inhibit implantation (by altering the 
endometrium). It is not effective once the process of 
implantation has begun.38 
The label for ella says: “When taken immediately before ovulation 
is to occur, ella postpones follicular rupture. The likely primary 
mechanism of action of [ella] for emergency contraception is 
therefore inhibition or delay of ovulation; however, alterations to 
the endometrium that may affect implantation may also 
contribute to efficacy.”39 
While both drugs indicate that they may function 
postfertilization, the fine print in their package inserts—for those 
who bother to read them40—would only muddy the question of 
whether the drug acts as an abortifacient.41 For example, in 
                                                                                                     
 37. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care 
Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 
C.F.R. pts. 2510, 2590; 45 C.F.R. pts. 147, 156) (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. 8611 (Feb. 
25, 1997) (“Emergency contraceptive pills are not effective if the woman is 
pregnant[.]”); 45 C.F.R. § 46.202(f) (“Pregnancy encompasses the period of time 
from implantation until delivery.”). 
 38. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label /2009/021998lbl.pdf (listing 
drug information for Plan B) (emphasis added). 
 39. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2010/022474s000lbl.pdf 
(listing drug information for ella) (emphasis added). 
 40. See infra Part V (detailing that drug inserts are designed for physicians 
who act as an intermediary).  
 41. See The FDA Announces New Prescription Drug Information Format, 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceCompliance 
RegulatoryInformation/LawsActsandRules/ucm188665.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 
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highly technical language,42 Plan B One-Step’s label says: “Plan B 
One-Step is believed to act as an emergency contraceptive 
principally by preventing ovulation or fertilization (by altering 
tubal transport of sperm and/or ova). In addition, it may inhibit 
implantation (by altering the endometrium).”43 Even though the 
label recognizes the possibility that Plan B One-Step may act 
postfertilization—a time that some would consider during 
“pregnancy”44—the label elsewhere flatly says it “is not effective 
in terminating an existing pregnancy.”45 
Implicit in both disclosures is a central claim: a woman is not 
“pregnant” until “implantation” occurs. Skeptics dismiss concerns 
that EC may destroy a zygote after fertilization but before 
implantation as just so much religious gibberish: “There’s no 
reason to think [the anti-choice movement will] suddenly grow 
respectful of actual science now that it has shown that emergency 
contraception has no effect on egg cells who’ve had their good 
Christian souls injected into them by those emissaries of the Lord 
known as sperm.”46  
Religious concerns about destroying a life, however, 
animate the Hobby Lobby Store, Inc. v. Sebelius47 and Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius48 cases challenging the 
                                                                                                     
2013) (“By improving the package insert to make it more useful for healthcare 
providers in their day-to-day clinical practice, we are making it easier for them 
to explain the benefits and risks of medications for their patients.” (quoting 
Health and Human Services Secretary Mike Leavit)) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 42. Generally, informed consent forms should be understandable by people 
with an eighth grade or lower reading level. See CARL H. COLEMAN, JERRY A. 
MENIKOFF, ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN 
SUBJECTS 181 (LexisNexis 2005). 
 43. PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 38, at 4. 
 44. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 45. PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 38, at 2. Plan B 
One-Step’s label also says it does not work “once the process of implantation has 
begun.” Id. at 4. By contrast, ella’s label provides no such assurance. But see 
ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 39, at 5 (stating that ella “postpones 
follicular rupture”).  
 46. Marcotte, supra note 31. 
 47. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en 
banc), appeal docketed, No. 13-354 (S. Ct. Sept. 19, 2013). 
 48. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 13-1144 (3d Cir. 
2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-356 (S. Ct. Sept. 19, 2013). 
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Mandate,49 which are now set before the United States Supreme 
Court for argument on March 25, 2014.50 In that litigation, the 
plaintiffs object to “drugs or devices that may cause the demise of 
an already conceived but not yet attached human embryo,” 
although they assert no objection to drugs that prevent 
fertilization.51 The en banc United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit chose not to “wade into scientific waters,” noting 
that “the government and the medical amici supporting the 
government concede that at least some [EC] to which the 
plaintiffs object have the potential to prevent uterine 
implantation.”52 Given the parties’ agreement that some forms of 
EC function in a manner that the plaintiffs “find morally 
problematic,” the en banc court found “no material dispute” about 
the science. Apart from the other issues those cases raises, the 
                                                                                                     
 49. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 
2013) (en banc) (challenging the Mandate). The plaintiffs sought declaratory 
and injunctive relief, alleging that the Mandate violated the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. The court held that the 
plaintiffs had standing, that the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the action, that 
corporations constituted “persons” within the meaning of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, that corporations had rights under the Free Exercise Clause, 
that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits, that the 
Administration’s interests in public health and gender equality do not constitute 
compelling interests, that the plaintiffs satisfied the irreparable injury prong for 
the preliminary injunction test, and that the case required remanding for 
consideration of the remaining preliminary injunction factors. Id. at 1121, 1129, 
1143–47; see also Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377, 
380 (3d Cir. 2013) (challenging aspects of the Mandate). A corporate employer 
and five owners brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging 
that the Mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First and 
Fifth Amendments, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. The court held 
that a for-profit, secular employer could not assert claims under the Free 
Exercise Clause or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Id. at 388. The court 
further held that the shareholders probably did not have a viable claim under 
the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 389. 
 50. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, OCTOBER TERM 2014: FOR THE 
SESSION BEGINNING MARCH 24, 2014, 1 (2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_calendars/MonthlyArgumentCalMar2014.pdf. 
 51. Complaint at 10, Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. 
Supp. 2d 394 (E.D. Penn. 2013) (No. 12-6744); see also Complaint Paragraph at 
24, Hobby Lobby Sores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) 
(No. CIV-12-1000-HE) (“Plan B, Ella, and certain IUDs can cause the death of 
the embryo.”). 
 52. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123 n.3 (10th Cir. 
2013) (en banc). 
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science remains deeply contested by many, in part because of 
where different parties draw the line for when they believe life 
begins.53 
 The next Part evaluates the factual claim that neither Plan 
B nor ella act after fertilization. 
III. Factual Basis for Religious Concerns 
The claim that EC does not cause abortion rests on two 
notions: (1) that EC works only as a contraceptive to prevent 
fertilization and never functions afterwards; and (2) that even if a 
drug worked postfertilization, nobody could possibly believe that 
a pregnancy—or a life—exists in the hours and days after 
fertilization, so any drug that works at this time cannot induce an 
“abortion” by definition.54  
This Part shows first that in the fifteen years since its 
approval, Plan B has never been shown to work after fertilization. 
Since ella’s approval in 2010,55 however, more than one expert 
has posited that ella not only works before fertilization but it may 
work after fertilization as well—in ways that would give some 
women pause about whether to use ella.56 Second, this Part 
                                                                                                     
 53. Id. 
 54. Nobody disputes that an abortion ends a pregnancy. See Abortion, THE 
FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/abortion (last visited Feb. 
11, 2014) (defining abortion as “[i]nduced termination of a pregnancy with 
destruction of the embryo or fetus”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 55. News Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves ella Tablets for 
Prescription Emergency Contraception (Aug. 13, 2010) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm222428.htm (announcing 
FDA approval of ella for use as emergency contraception).  
 56. See infra Part III.A.2 (describing how ella may work). This Article does 
not examine the science behind the other contested drugs and devices because 
the contrast between Plan B and ella sufficiently illustrates the factual debate 
over how different ECs work. Although not necessary to this Article, the IUD 
labels contain similar disclosures to those for ella. For a discussion of copper 
IUDs, see Batur, supra note 12, at 774 (explaining that “the copper IUD also 
prevents implantation after fertilization, which likely explains its high 
efficacy”). For further discussion, see generally Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson, 
Cecilia Berger & P.G.L. Lalitkumar, Review Article: Emergency Contraception—
Mechanisms of Action, 87 CONTRACEPTION 300 (2013) (discussing mechanisms of 
action of IUDs and their physiological effects). For a searchable database of FDA 
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documents that—although a handful of medical organizations 
and federal regulators share the same view of when pregnancy 
begins—medical treatises, dictionaries, and practicing Ob/Gyns 
are all over the map on the question of when pregnancy—or for 
that matter, when life—begins. More fundamentally, women 
themselves have strikingly different views about when life 
begins—and what would count as ending it.57 Ultimately, what 
matters is their view as to whether a given drug constitutes an 
abortion. 
A. Contraceptives or Abortifacients?: Unraveling Science and 
Semantics 
Nearly everyone—from the Administration to religious 
objectors to the New York Times—lumps all EC together, 
charging that they do or do not cause abortions.58 As Part II 
                                                                                                     
drugs, see FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRUGS AT FDA: FDA APPROVED DRUG 
PRODUCTS (2013), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugs 
atfda/. 
 57. See infra Part IV. 
 58. See Editorial, How Morning After Pills Really Work, N.Y. TIMES, June 
8, 2012 at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/opinion/how-
morning-after-pills-really-work.html (referring to all EC as simply the “the 
pill”); What You Need to Know, supra note 6, at 1 (stating that “[a]ccording to 
the best scientific evidence available, all FDA-approved emergency 
contraceptive pills work by interfering with ovulation or fertilization before 
pregnancy begins and are not so-called ‘abortion pills’”); Q&A with Dr. Cullins: 
Emergency Contraception, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.planned 
parenthood.org/health-topics/ask-dr-cullins/cullins-ec-5360.htm (last visited Dec. 
20, 2013) (discussing the mechanism of action of EC as if all EC is the same, 
stating “EC works by stopping ovulation or fertilization . . . it could interfere 
with the implantation of a fertilized egg, but there is no scientific proof that this 
happens”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Complaint at 5, 
La. Coll. v. Sebelius, (W.D. La. Feb. 18, 2012) (No. 12-cv-463), 
http://www.adfmedia.org/files/LouisianaCollegeComplaint.pdf 
In the category of “FDA approved contraceptives” included in this 
Mandate are several drugs or devices that may cause the demise of 
an already-conceived but not-yet implanted human embryo. . . . 
Likewise in that category are “emergency contraception” or “Plan B” 
(the “morning after” pill), and variations of oral contraceptives (“birth 
control pills” or “the Pill”) taken regularly through a cycle. . . . The 
FDA approved in this same category a drug called “ella” (the “week 
after” pill), which studies show can function to kill embryos even after 
they have implanted in the uterus, by a mechanism similar to the 
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illustrated, the FDA label disclosures lend to a singular narrative 
about how these drugs work, but the science plainly does not.59  
Consider the 2013 review article, “Separating Fact from 
Fiction,”60 by the Independent Family Health Center at the 
Cleveland Clinic, home of the third-ranked gynecology program 
in the United States.61 The review article surveyed dozens of 
scientific, peer-reviewed articles across more than a decade, 
including one meta-analysis of the literature. The author, Dr. 
Pelin Batur, Education Director of Primary Care of Women’s 
Health, concluded that both Plan B and ella “work[] primarily by 
delaying or inhibiting ovulation and inhibiting fertilization.”62 
Nonetheless, important differences exist between Plan B’s and 
ella’s mechanisms of action: “[Plan B] . . . would be unlikely to 
have any adverse effects on the endometrium after fertilization, 
since [it] would only serve to enhance the progesterone effect. 
Therefore, [it is] unlikely to affect the ability of the embryo to 
attach to the endometrium.”63 By contrast, ella  
can have just the opposite effect on the postovulatory 
endometrium because of its inhibitory action on progesterone. 
[Ella] is structurally similar to [RU-486], and its mechanism of 
action varies depending on the time of administration during 
the menstrual cycle. When unprotected intercourse occurs 
during a time when fertility is not possible, [ella] behaves like 
a placebo. When intercourse occurs just before ovulation, [ella] 
acts by delaying ovulation and thereby preventing fertilization 
(similar to [Plan B]). [Ella] may have an additional action of 
affecting the ability of the embryo to either attach to the 
endometrium or maintain its attachment, by a variety of 
mechanisms of action.64 
                                                                                                     
abortion drug RU-486. 
 59. See infra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that ella can work 
very differently from Plan B under certain circumstances). 
 60. Batur, supra note 12, at 771 (dispelling common misunderstandings 
about EC). 
 61. Top-Ranked Hospitals for Gynecology, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP. 
(2013), http://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/rankings/gynecology (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 62. Batur, supra note 12, at 774. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
1400 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1385 (2014) 
As the next subparts detail, our independent review of the 
scientific literature reaches the same conclusion: in all 
probability, Plan B does not work after fertilization, despite the 
FDA-approved label, while ella may act after fertilization, 
sometimes.  
1. How Plan B Works 
It is no surprise that many want to lump Plan B and ella 
together: both work after unprotected sex to prevent “expected 
pregnancy.”65 At one point, both drugs required a prescription, 
although Plan B can now be found on the shelf next to common 
cold medicines, suppositories, and condoms.66  
While Plan B is effective for only 72 hours after sex,67 ella 
works over a longer time span. Ella remains effective up to 120 
hours after sex.68 Given the longer timespan, ella is much more 
effective in preventing pregnancy than Plan B.69 In one 2006 
study, women who received ella experienced “about half the 
number of pregnancies than in those treated with [Plan B], with 
                                                                                                     
 65. See PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 38, at 1 
(stating that Plan B is intended for use as an EC after unprotected intercourse); 
ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 39, at 1 (noting the ella is also 
intended for use after unprotected intercourse to prevent pregnancy).“Expected 
Pregnancy” “calculate[es] the number of pregnancies that might have occurred 
without use of the intervention.” Anna F. Glacier et al., Ulipristal Acetate Versus 
Levonorgestrel for Emergency Contraception: A Randomised Non-Inferiority 
Trial and Meta-Analysis, 375 LANCET 555, 555 (2010). 
 66. See Julie Rovner, Plan B to Hit Shelves, Protected from Generics, NPR 
(July 24, 2013, 3:18 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/07/24/ 
205182187/plan-b-to-hit-shelves-protected-from-generics (last visited Jan. 21, 
2014) (“Plan B One-Step . . . will be available on pharmacy and other retail 
shelves without restriction.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Sydney Lupkin, Judge Orders “Morning-After” Pill Be Sold Over-the-
Counter to Those Under 17, ABCNEWS (Apr. 5, 2013), http://abcnews. 
go.com/Health/morning-pill-sold-counter/story?id=18889946 (last visited Jan. 
21, 2014) (“The FDA allowed Plan B to become available without a prescription 
to women 18 and over in 2006.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). Ella still requires a prescription. See News Release, supra note 55 
(noting that ella is available “by prescription-only”).  
 67. PLAN B ONE-STEP PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 38, at 1. 
 68. ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, supra note 39, at 1. 
 69. See Batur, supra note 12, at 772 (noting that ella is the most effective 
oral EC). 
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pregnancy rates of 0.9% vs 1.7%.”70 A later study found that ella 
prevented 85% of expected pregnancies compared to Plan B’s 
69%.71 
Part and parcel of Plan B’s reduced efficacy are the 
mechanisms by which it is now understood to work. Amassed 
across fifteen years and thousands of articles,72 authorities agree 
that Plan B works73 to delay or inhibit ovulation: “Early 
treatment with [EC]s containing only the progestin 
levonorgestrel [as Plan B does] has been shown to impair the 
ovulatory process and luteal function.”74 While a single study has 
suggested that Plan B may affect receptivity of the endometrium, 
two later studies directly designed to assess this possibility could 
not confirm it.75All available evidence suggests Plan B acts prior 
                                                                                                     
 70. Id. 
 71. See Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson & Chun-Xia Meng, Emergency 
Contraception: Potential Role of Ulipristal Acetate, 2 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 
53, 57 (2010) (comparing results in an efficacy study of ECs). 
 72. Two searches on ScienceDirect.com, one limited by “levonorgestrel,” 
Plan B’s chemical name, and the other by “ulipristal acetate,” ella’s chemical 
name, yield 7,815 journals, 627 books, and 43 reference works for Plan B and a 
mere 114 journals, 29 book, and 0 reference works for ella. Review articles show 
the same pattern. One review article of the mechanism of action for various EC 
canvassed 28 studies of Plan B but included only 3 studies of ella. See Gemzell-
Danielsson, Berger & Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 306–08 (listing references 
for the article, including the studies on which the discussion was based).  
 73. At one time, some speculated that Plan B also impeded the sperm, but 
authorities now agree that Plan B is not likely to work this way at commercially 
available doses. See James Trussell, Elizabeth G. Raymond & Kelly Cleland, 
Emergency Contraception: A Last Chance to Prevent Unintended Pregnancy 6 
(Dec. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ec-
review.pdf  
In a study conducted more than 30 years ago, levonorgestrel was 
found to interfere with sperm migration and function at all levels of 
the genital tract; however, a study designed to assess this issue found 
that 1.5 mg levonorgestrel had no effect on the quality of cervical 
mucus or on the penetration of spermatozoa in the uterine cavity. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger 
& Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 302 (“In vitro data indicate that [Plan B] . . . in 
doses relevant for EC has no direct effect on sperm function.”).  
 74. Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 6. 
 75. See id. (discussing studies on early treatment with EC pills). Further, 
one study found no effect on the endometrium while the other found that Plan B 
does affect concentrations of glycodelin, a molecule that “inhibits fertilization, 
[and] may indicate an additional mechanism of action when ovulation is not 
inhibited.” Id.  
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to fertilization, as an ordinary contraceptive. In essence, the 
sperm never meets the egg. 
While Plan B’s mechanism of action has been extensively 
studied, permitting experts to now rule out a postfertilization 
mechanism of action,76 ella lacks this depth of research.77 
Although nascent, a burgeoning literature seeks to pinpoint 
precisely what explains ella’s “enhanced effectiveness.”78 
2. How Ella May Work 
Leading authorities agree that, like Plan B, ella’s primary 
mechanism of action is to prevent ovulation.79 The key difference 
                                                                                                     
 76. See Batur, supra note 12, at 774 (finding Plan B unlikely to have any 
effects after fertilization); Trussell, supra note 73, at 7 (noting Plan B has no 
effect after fertilization), Gemzell-Danielsson, supra note 56, at 302 (finding no 
effect after fertilization when using Plan B in studies with monkeys and rats). 
Of course, no study can definitely, positively, absolutely exclude the possibility 
of a postfertilization effect, even as to Plan B. Authors of the studies showing a 
contraceptive effect acknowledge that “[i]t is unlikely that this question can ever 
be unequivocally answered, and we therefore cannot conclude that [ECs] never 
prevent pregnancy after fertilization.” James Trussell & Beth Jordan, 
Mechanism of Action of Emergency Contraception Pills, 74 CONTRACEPTION 87, 
87 (2006); see also Gabriela Noe et al., Contraceptive Efficacy of Emergency 
Contraception with Levonorgestrel Given Before or After Ovulation, 81 
CONTRACEPTION 414, 414 (2010) (conceding that studies of Plan B’s impact on 
“endometrial receptivity,” a post fertilization effect, “are not consistent, and 
current knowledge on cellular and molecular markers of endometrial receptivity 
in the human is insufficient to resolve this controversy”). 
As Jeffrey Keenan, a professor of obstetrics and gynecology and director of 
the Division of Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility at the University of 
Tennessee Medical Center, explains, clinical studies of Plan B “were not 
designed to assess this possibility.” Jeffrey Keenan, Ulipristal Acetate: 
Contraceptive or Contragestive?, 45 ANNALS OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 813, 814 
(2011). To give of the kind of certainty that some would like to see, “each study 
participant [would have had] to undergo laboratory evaluation and possibly 
sonographic examination to determine whether ovulation had already occurred.” 
Id. Asking women themselves may not be promising, given the fact that “over 
30% of women presenting for [EC]s had inaccurately dated their own menstrual 
cycles.” Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 3. 
 77. See supra note 72 (noting that available information on ella is 
somewhat limited). 
 78. Keenan, supra note 76, at 814. 
 79. See Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 7 (discussing more 
than a half dozen studies that indicated ella prevents ovulation); Gemzell-
Danielsson, Berger & Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 302 (discussing the effect of 
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between the two: ella “is able to inhibit or significantly delay 
follicular rupture for over 5 days if given immediately before 
ovulation by postponing the LH peak”—that is, the spike of the 
hormone that triggers ovulation.80 Thus, “when ovulation is 
imminent, [ella] is more effective than [Plan B] in delaying 
[ovulation].”81 
While authorities universally agree that ella delays 
ovulation,82 they are divided about whether ella may work by 
other mechanisms as well, as ella’s label suggests. Some posit 
that ella may work through a “contragestive” effect, in which 
“only gestation (implantation and growth) of the embryo 
[fertilized egg] is prevented.”83 When would this occur?  
It would occur if ella altered the endometrium and the 
change “hamper[ed] implantation.”84 In a 2010 study, Pamela 
Stratton and colleagues examined the effects of three different 
doses of ella on the endometrium and compared them to a 
                                                                                                     
ella on ovulation); Ralph P. Miech, Immunopharmacology of Ulipristal as an 
Emergency Contraceptive, 3 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 391, 392 (2011) (noting 
that ella acts by delaying ovulation); Keenan, supra note 76, at 813 (noting that 
ella’s primary function is to prevent ovulation, and that ella is “significantly 
more effective in this role than other forms of [EC]”).  
 80. See V. Brache et al., Immediate Pre-Ovulatory Administration of 30 mg 
Ulipristal Acetate Significantly Delays Follicular Rupture, HUM. REPROD. 2256, 
2262 (2010) (concluding that “this study provides mechanistic evidence to 
explain how [ella] could be more effective in preventing pregnancy than current 
reference EC methods”).  
As another review article puts it, the primary explanation for ella’s 
increased effectiveness over Plan B is that ella is “effective even when 
administered before ovulation, when LH has already started to rise, a time 
period when [Plan B] is no longer effective.” Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger & 
Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 305. 
 81. Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 4.  
 82. See also Miech, supra note 79, at 392 (“[ella’s] effectiveness as an EC is 
extended up to 120 hours after intercourse . . . and is [] effective as an EC if 
taken during rising LH levels prior to ovulation.”); Keenan, supra note 76, at 
813 (“There is good reason to believe that one mechanism of action for [ella] is 
the inhibition of ovulation. In fact, it appears to be significantly more effective in 
this role than other forms of [EC] such as [Plan B] . . . .”). 
 83. Keenan, supra note 76, at 814; see also ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, 
supra note 39, at 9 (noting that ella may work to prevent implantation).  
 84. Pamela Stratton et al., Dometrial Effects of a Single Early Luteal Dose 
of the Selective Progesterone Receptor Modulator CDB-2914, 93 FERTILITY AND 
STERILITY 2035, 2040 (2010). 
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placebo.85 The authors found “a significant reduction in 
endometrial thickness among those subjects receiving [ella] 
compared with those receiving placebo.”86 They concluded that 
“taken together, these endometrial effects in the absence of 
ovarian and menstrual cycle effects suggest mechanisms by 
which [ella] might be effective as an emergency contraceptive.”87 
Importantly, others caution that “whether this change would 
inhibit implantation is unknown.”88  
A pair of experts has asked whether ella, if taken sufficiently 
late, is in fact working after fertilization.89 Ralph Miech, an 
associate professor emeritus of molecular pharmacology, 
physiology, and biotechnology at Brown University, contends that 
ella has a “direct abortifacient effect” in a very narrow set of 
circumstances.90 He defines “abortifacient” to mean the “loss of 
the embryo occurring either at the preimplantation stage or at 
the post-implantation stage.”91 According to Miech, this would 
occur “[w]hen unprotected intercourse occurs within the fertility 
window (i.e., less than 120 hours (5 days) before ovulation or not 
more than 24 hours after ovulation) and [ella] is taken after 
fertilization.”92 He envisions a “host-versus-graft rejection 
                                                                                                     
 85. See id. at 2036 (examining whether ella, at any doses, delayed 
endometrial maturation, reduced endometrial thickness, or affected the number 
of progesterone receptors). 
 86. Id. at 2038. 
 87. Id. at 2040. 
 88. See Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 5 (discussing 
Stratton’s findings). Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger, and Lalitkumar contend that 
“the effect of lower doses equivalent to the 30 mg used for EC was similar to 
that of placebo,” but this synopsis does not accord with the study findings 
themselves. Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger & Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 304. 
Cf. Stratton et al., supra note 84, at 2038 tbl.1 (reporting the endometrial effects 
of ella). 
 89. See supra note 79 (noting that both authorities, Miech and Keenan, 
agree that ella works primarily to prevent ovulation).  
 90. Miech, supra note 79, at 392. 
 91. Id. (“This report [uses] the classical definitions of abortion and 
contraceptive. Abortion is defined as the loss of the embryo occurring either at 
the preimplantation stage or at the post-implantation stage and contraception is 
defined as the prevention of fertilization.”). A post-implantation effect would be 
an abortifacient under almost every medical definition and those Federal 
regulations in place since the 1970s. See supra note 37 and accompanying text 
(discussing the difference between contraception and abortifacient drugs). 
 92. Miech, supra note 79, at 392. 
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mechanism during the embryo’s attempt to implant into the 
decidua.”93 In other words, ella may actually operate on the 
embryo during the implantation process.  
In a 2011 article in the Annals of Pharmacotherapy, Jeffrey 
Keenan, Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University 
of Tennessee Medical Center in Knoxville, concluded that if a 
woman takes ella within five days of unprotected sex and after 
the fertilization, ella’s “mechanism of action is much more 
accurately described as contragestive, since only gestation 
(implantation and growth) of the embryo [fertilized egg] is 
prevented.”94 Keenan believes this action likely accounts for ella’s 
“enhanced effectiveness” relative to Plan B.95 Disclosures from 
medical professionals and drug manufacturers should be 
“provided according to the best evidence available,” as is the 
standard in European Union countries.96 Some scientists move 
past the concern that any kind of EC might act as an 
abortifacient—in the views of women using them—by noting that 
ECs “do not interrupt an established pregnancy, defined . . . as 
beginning with implantation.”97 And as the next subpart 
illustrates, even the meaning of pregnancy is deeply contested. 
B. The Meaning of Life—Or at Least Pregnancy 
Obviously, how one defines pregnancy determines whether a 
given drug or device may induce an abortion in one’s view.98 Some 
                                                                                                     
 93. Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. Keenan, supra note 76, at 814; see also ELLA PRESCRIBING INFORMATION, 
supra note 39, at 9 (noting that ella “may also work by preventing attachment”). 
 95. See Keenan, supra note 76, at 814 (noting that ella’s “contragestive 
effect” is likely why it is so effective). 
96. See generally EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION, 
supra note 19. 
 97. Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 7. 
 98. Vivian W. Y. Leung, Marc Levine & Judith A. Soon, Mechanisms of 
Action of Hormonal Emergency Contraceptives, 30 PHARMACOTHERAPY 158, 160 
(2010) (“For people who define pregnancy as beginning at implantation, an 
abortifacient is an agent that interferes with subsequent processes. . . . For 
those who consider pregnancy to begin with the completion of fertilization, an 
abortifacient is an agent that interferes with any postfertilization event, 
including implantation.”).  
Some people may believe that pregnancy begins at implantation, yet 
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groups, like the Guttmacher Institute, assert that the medical 
profession uniformly measures pregnancy from “implantation.”99 
The evidence for this proposition: “Major medical 
organizations . . . as well as U.S. government policy, consider a 
pregnancy to have begun only when the entire process of 
conception is complete, which is to say after the fertilized egg has 
implanted in the lining of the uterus.”100  
Despite this confident assertion, a quick review of medical 
authorities reveals no unitary view. Some authorities measure 
pregnancy from fertilization101 and some from implantation.102 
Others measure pregnancy from an “established pregnancy,”103 a 
                                                                                                     
nonetheless believe that a drug that prevents implantation ends the existence of 
either a living, human organism (short of a pregnancy) or destroys something 
that has a special moral status. See infra notes 113–44. 
 99. See Sneha Barot, Past Due: Emergency Contraception in U.S. 
Reproductive Health Programs Overseas, 13 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 8, 8 (2010), 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/13/2/gpr130208.html (noting 
that “the Catholic Church and many antiabortion advocates” embrace a 
definition of pregnancy “flatly rejected by the medical profession” and that 
“under this definition, pregnancy begins with the ‘moment of fertilization’—the 
union of an egg and sperm”). 
 100. Id. at 8–9. Guttmacher also asserts that the meaning of “abortifacient” 
in federal law is clear; however, it is not as unambiguous as Guttmacher would 
have people believe. See Wilson, The Calculus, supra note 2, at 1456, 1459 
(reviewing federal guidance about what counts as an abortifacient under federal 
regulations); Wilson, Demagoguing Abortion, supra note 2 (summarizing federal 
hearings in 1975 over the classifications of diethylstilbestrol as a contraceptive, 
a drug that studies in the Congressional Record indicated works on the 
endometrial implantation site, but was later pulled from the market as a 
teratogen). The FDA classified diethylstilbestrol as a contraceptive because it 
“prevent[ed] implantation.” Id. Ella is posited to work, sometimes, during the 
process of implantation itself, raising a thorny question of how to construe 
FDA’s definition. Id. 
 101. See Grace S. Chung et. al, Obstetrician-Gynecologists’ Beliefs About 
When Pregnancy Begins, 206 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 132.e1, 132.e1 
(2012), available at http://www.ajog.org/article/S0002-9378(11)02223-X/fulltext 
(showing some measure pregnancy from fertilization). 
 102. See id. (“Since 1965, the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG) has defined pregnancy as beginning with implantation of 
the embryo in the uterine wall. This definition is used also by the Guttmacher 
Institute, Planned Parenthood, and some textbooks.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 103. See AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, STATEMENT ON 
CONTRACEPTIVE METHODS 1 (1998) (listing the “[e]ssential steps necessary for 
pregnancy” as ending with “implantation of the blastocyst into the lining of the 
uterus at the conclusion of which pregnancy is established”). 
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positive pregnancy test,104 and the first heartbeat,105 among 
others.106 Clearly, however, the two leading contenders for the 
beginning of pregnancy are “implantation”107 and 
“fertilization.”108   
Medical professionals themselves split on what marks the 
start of pregnancy. Fifty-seven percent of U.S. Ob/Gyns said 
pregnancy begins at “conception,” by which the study authors 
believed respondents meant fertilization.109 Twenty-eight percent 
of Ob/Gyns said pregnancy begins at implantation, and sixteen 
percent were “not sure which statement comes closest to their 
beliefs.”110 Those surveyed brought preconceived notions to the 
question. The strongest predictors of how Ob/Gyns defined 
pregnancy were the importance of religion in their lives and their 
own views on abortion.111  
                                                                                                     
 104. See Keenan, supra note 76, at 814 (attributing to ACOG a definition of 
pregnancy that “begin[s] not with fertilization of the egg, but advancing 
implantation as demonstrated by a positive pregnancy test” (footnote omitted)).  
 105. Chung et. al, supra note 102, at 132.e5. 
 106. See id. (noting that “a significant percentage of Ob/Gyn physicians 
(16%) [who completed the questionnaire] marked ‘not sure’ when asked to 
indicate when pregnancy begins”). The two primary options were “conception” 
and “implantation.” Id. at 132.e1. Given the percentage of “not sure” responses, 
“it is possible that a significant minority of physicians have not made up their 
minds or that they believe that their views could not be reduced to either of the 
2 options that were offered.” Id. at 132.e5. 
 107. See John K. Jain, When Does Pregnancy Begin?, SHARECARE, 
http://www.sharecare.com/health/prior-to-conception/when-does-pregnancy-beg 
in;jsessionid=787ABB31090D6282CC87D03389AE56BD (last visited Jan. 31, 
2014) (concluding that “pregnancy officially begins at the time of implantation 
but is usually not detectable until the pregnancy hormone shows up in the blood 
and urine”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 108. See Walter L. Larimore, Joseph B. Stanford & Chris Kahlenborn, 
Letters to the Editor: In Response: Does Pregnancy Begin at Fertilization?, 36 
FAM. MED. 690, 690 (2004) (stating that many maintain pregnancy starts the 
“instant that a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote”).  
 109. Chung et. al, supra note 102, at 132.e6. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 132.e3–e4 (“[R]eligious doctors and those who objected to 
abortion were less likely to be ‘not sure’. . . . [B]elieving that pregnancy begins at 
implantation rather than conception (excluding those who were ‘not sure’) was 
associated with religious affiliation, the importance of religion, and objections to 
abortion.”).  
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Just as important as this split, pregnancy is often a proxy for 
measuring the “onset of life.”112 Fertilization and implantation 
are not the only two markers for measuring the “onset of life,” as 
Dr. Maureen Condic, Associate Professor of Neurobiology and 
Anatomy at the University of Utah School of Medicine, explains: 
Recently, it has been asserted that the life and moral status of 
the embryo begin at the eight-cell stage, because zygotic 
transcription (the active utilization of embryonic genes) 
commences at this time; and prior to this moment, whatever is 
happening in the “fertilized egg” is being driven by maternal 
factors. Some push the onset of life to even later, to the 
formation of specific structures or the onset of specific 
developmental processes. 113 
Philosophers, theologians, ethicists, and others have devoted 
thousands of pages to whether “personhood determines the 
beginning of human life,” whether “rationality is necessary for 
personhood,” and whether personhood begins with the “active 
potential for further development as a person,” the “development 
of the primitive streak,” or when the organism becomes a 
“unique” individual.114 Some ask whether, even absent 
personhood, the “embryo has a significant moral status” worthy of 
respect.115 
While the Guttmacher Institute, the Administration, and 
others rely on the Code of Federal Regulations116 in dismissing 
religiously grounded concerns, individual women follow their 
personal moral codes, as the next Part explains. 
                                                                                                     
 112. See Condic, supra note 101, at 1–2 (describing various ways to 
biologically define when life begins). For a general discussion of the beginning of 
life, whether at pregnancy or other points or whether a potential life is due 
special consideration, see the excellent book, DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END 
OF LIFE: READINGS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS (John. P. Lizza ed., 
2009).  
 113. Condic, supra note 101, at 1 (footnotes omitted). 
 114. See John P. Lizza, Introduction to DEFINING THE BEGINNING AND END OF 
LIFE: READINGS ON PERSONAL IDENTITY AND BIOETHICS 1, 5 (John. P. Lizza ed., 
2009) (summarizing various theories included in the book on when life begins). 
 115. See id. (noting that “most Jewish thinkers” believe an embryo does not 
become a “person” until birth but is nonetheless entitled to protection during 
“gestation”). 
 116. See supra note 37 (showing reliance by the Administration on 
regulatory definitions of pregnancy in other contexts); see also supra note 100 
and accompanying text (discussing the definition of pregnancy). 
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IV. Women Care About Mechanisms of Action 
Caught in the midst of an argument by label, women are now 
no more informed about how EC works than before the 
Mandate.117 But they still care.  
Physicians have long recognized that “the majority of 
women . . . want to be informed . . . about mechanisms of action 
taking place after fertilization and implantation, regardless of 
their religiosity or whether they believed that human life begins 
at fertilization or implantation.”118 In 2004, when the FDA made 
Plan B available over the counter, the scientific advisory 
committee to the FDA urged the FDA to include appropriate 
disclosures on Plan B’s label precisely “so that women could make 
an informed choice about its use and avoid inadvertently 
violating their own moral or religious beliefs.”119 Disclosures from 
medical professionals and drug manufacturers should be 
“provided according to the best evidence available,” as is the 
standard in European Union countries.120  
Empirical studies of women’s attitudes across the United 
States, in both urban and suburban settings, confirm the 
importance that women place on information. A 2005 study of 
women 18–50 seen in Utah and Oklahoma family practices and 
Ob/Gyn clinics found that 53% would not use a birth-control 
method that acts after fertilization but before implantation.121 
                                                                                                     
 117. Supra Part II. 
 118. Cristina Lopez-del Burgo et al., Knowledge and Beliefs About 
Mechanism of Action Birth Control Methods Among European Women, 85 
CONTRACEPTION 69, 75 (2012); see also Christy A. Sherman, S. Marie Harvey, 
Linda J. Beckman & Diana B. Petitti, Emergency Contraception: Knowledge and 
Attitudes of Health Care Providers in a Health Maintenance Organization, 11 
WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 448, 452 (2001) (surveying San Diego County, 
California healthcare providers including Ob/Gyns and reporting that “[n]early 
all (99.4%) of the providers surveyed reported they agreed with the statement 
‘Women who specifically ask for information about emergency contraceptive 
pills should be given information,’ with 85% of providers indicating strong 
agreement”).  
 119. See Lockwood, supra note 19, at 15 (noting that “[m]any on the FDA 
panel perceived that a contragestive effect [e.g., an effect after fertilization 
occurs] was possible and we recommended that the package labeling should 
describe the drug’s potential mechanism of action”). 
 120. See generally EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION, 
supra note 19. 
 121. Huong M. Dye et al., Women and Post-Fertilization Effects of Birth 
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Seventy-four percent would not use a method that acts after 
implantation.122 When asked if they would change their own birth 
control method if told that “there was a remote possibility” that it 
acted after fertilization but before implantation, 44% “would stop 
using it,” while 69% “would stop using it” if there was a “remote 
possibility” of it acting after implantation.123  
For many of these women, their reticence directly reflects 
their beliefs about when life begins. Forty-eight percent of women 
“reported the personal belief that human life begins at 
fertilization” and another 5% answered that “life begins after 
fertilization, but before implantation.”124 Of all women surveyed, 
34% answered that “life begins at fertilization and [that they] 
would not use a birth control method that acts [after 
fertilization]”—while 3% answered that life starts at fertilization 
but they would nonetheless use a birth control method that acts 
after fertilization.125 
Women in the southeastern United States also expressed deep 
discomfort with EC that acts after fertilization. In an anonymous 
2008 questionnaire of women seen at two academic family 
medicine clinics, 38% of all respondents said they would use EC 
but only if “it worked before fertilization or implantation,”126—
                                                                                                     
Control: Consistency of Beliefs, Intentions and Reported Use, 5 BMC WOMEN’S 
HEALTH, Nov. 29, 2005, at 4, http://www.biomedcentral.com/content/pdf/1472-
6874-5-11.pdf. For a description of the study sites, see id. at 2–3 (noting that the 
Oklahoma site was “a teaching clinic associated with a family medicine 
residency program sponsored by a Protestant religious organization” and that 
“[n]one of the clinics in Utah were religiously affiliated or sponsored”).  
 122. Id. at 4. 
 123. Id. No EC required by the Mandate is presently understood to act after 
implantation. See supra Part III (discussing RU-486, which is not mandated). 
Surveys of women who are not faced directly with the possibility of pregnancy 
after unprotected sex may not capture the views of women faced with that 
possibility. Choices presented in a vacuum might look very different if a woman 
suddenly finds herself in need of EC. 
 124. Dye et al., supra note 111, at 5. 
 125. Id. at 5–6. 
 126. See John W. Campbell III et al., Attitudes and Beliefs About Emergency 
Contraception Among Patients at Academic Family Medicine Clinics, 6 ANNALS 
FAM. MED. S23, S23 (2008) (utilizing a “convenience sample [size of 178] of 
female patients aged 18 to 50 years.”). Researchers asked: “Pregnancy begins 
when[:] A. Sperm and egg join within the female reproductive tract. B. 
Implantation occurs. C. The heart starts beating. D. Unsure. E. Other.” Id. at 
S24. 
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admittedly an inartful question.127 Nearly half, 47%, “believed that 
pregnancy begins with fertilization.”128 Isolating the impact of 
socioeconomic factors, only annual household income of less than 
$40,000 correlated with a woman’s belief that life begins at 
fertilization—with those under $25,000 most likely to believe the 
life begins at fertilization.129 Strength of religious beliefs, age, 
race, and level of education were irrelevant.130 Ironically, the 
women whose life chances are likely to be most impacted by an 
unintended pregnancy—poorer women with fewer resources—
were precisely the ones most likely to believe that life begins at 
fertilization.131 
 Researchers for John W. Campbell III and colleagues also 
gauged knowledge of EC’s mechanism of action. A “majority of 
women surveyed did not know that one possible mechanism of 
action of EC is to prevent implantation of a fertilized ovum.”132 
Although “women aged 25 years or younger were more likely to 
think that EC works before the egg and sperm join than older 
women[,] [t]here w[ere] no significant differences in the 
perception . . . based on age, race, income, education, or strength 
of religious beliefs.”133 The authors’ takeaway message was that 
“m[a]ny women are uninformed about the possible mechanisms of 
action of EC, and we found no reliable predictors for those who 
were better informed.”134 Better knowledge would not matter to 
everyone—42% were unsure whether better knowledge of a drug’s 
                                                                                                     
 127. The inartfully drafted “fertilization or implantation” question is not as 
probative as it would have been if it had separated views about prefertilization 
methods from postfertilization, pre-implantation methods. 
 128. Campbell et al., supra note 126, at S23. Although 47% of respondents 
indicated that “pregnancy begins with fertilization,” only 30% believed that “life 
begins with fertilization” even if pregnancy was not present. Id. (emphasis 
added). 
 129. See id. at S25 (“Women with incomes of less than $40,000 [per year] 
were more likely to believe that life begins at the joining of sperm and egg than 
women with higher incomes.”). 
 130. Id. at S25–S26. 
 131. See generally NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE 
FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010). 
 132. Campbell et al., supra note 126, at S26. 
 133. Id. at S25–S26. 
 134. Id. at S23. 
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mechanism would change their practices.135 Nonetheless, the 
authors stressed the “need to better educate [women] about 
[EC’s] possible mechanisms of action.”136 
In a 2004 study of Latino women seen at two reproductive 
health clinics in southeast Texas, “women who believed that EC 
worked mainly by preventing implantation were significantly less 
willing to use it than those who believed that it prevented 
ovulation.”137 Religious background did not affect this 
willingness,138 although factual misconceptions about EC did.139 
As the authors noted, “EC reduces the risk of pregnancy by 
preventing or delaying ovulation, inhibiting fertilization, and 
possibly inhibiting implantation. However, a belief that 
implantation is the primary mechanism or that EC interrupts 
gestation would not be correct.”140 The authors found “the odds of 
being unwilling to use EC were roughly six times higher among 
women who believed that EC prevents pregnancy at implantation 
when compared to women who believed that EC affects ovulation 
processes.”141 The researchers chalked up unwillingness to use 
EC to “misinformation about the mechanism of action.”142 
Education to correct misconceptions about the mechanism of 
action of EC would “help alleviate [Latino women’s] concerns, 
which in turn may increase their willingness to use EC.”143 
Although the researchers surveyed women in 2004—long before 
ella came on the scene—the general proposition stands. For many 
women, EC that “affects fertilization or implantation” is morally 
objectionable.144 
                                                                                                     
 135. Id. at S25. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Laura F. Romo et al., The Role of Misconceptions on Latino Women’s 
Acceptance of Emergency Contraceptive Pills, 69 CONTRACEPTION 227, 233 
(2004). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 229 (endnote omitted). 
 141. Id. at 232. 
 142. Id. at 233 (“Specifically women who believed that EC prevents 
pregnancy at ovulation reported less moral objections to its use than women 
who believe that EC affects fertilization or implantation.”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.  
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While there is good reason to worry about the 
representativeness of these studies, women in Europe,145 
Mexico,146 and Spain147 also communicate uneasiness about drugs 
that may act after fertilization. As the next Part argues, women 
can vindicate their own beliefs and values only if informed, in 
layman’s terms, about how these drugs may act in their own 
bodies. 
V. The Duty of Informed Consent 
Aimed at autonomy, individual rights, and self-
determination,148 informed consent fits naturally with American 
                                                                                                     
 145. See Lopez-del Burgo et al., supra note 118, at 69 (randomly surveying 
women in “Germany, France, the UK, Sweden, and Romania” and finding that, 
“[r]egardless of [participants’] sociodemographic characteristics and their belief 
about when human life begins,” the “majority [of women surveyed, 75%,] want 
to be informed about possible postfertilization effects [of contraceptive 
methods]”). 
 146. See Heather Gould, Charlotte Ellertson & Georgina Corona, Knowledge 
and Attitudes About the Difference Between Emergency Contraception and 
Medical Abortion Among Middle-Class Women and Men of Reproductive Age in 
Mexico City, 66 CONTRACEPTION 417, 423 (2002) (“Because one possible 
mechanism of action involves impeding implantation of a fertilized egg, some 
participants continue to equate EC with abortion.”). 
 147. See Cristina Lopez-del Burgo et al., Spanish Women’s Attitudes Toward 
Post-Fertilization Effects of Birth Control Methods, 151 EUR. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY AND REPROD. BIOLOGY 56, 57 (2010) (finding that “45% of women 
[surveyed] . . . would not consider using a [contraceptive] method that may work 
after fertilization and 57% would not consider using one that may work after 
implantation”).  
 148. See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND 
CLINICAL PRACTICE 14 (2d ed. 2001) (noting the values that guide informed 
consent). As Bernard Lo notes, “participation in decisions generally has other 
beneficial consequences for patients, such as increased sense of control, self-
efficacy, and adherence to plans for care.” BERNARD LO, RESOLVING ETHICAL 
DILEMMAS: A GUIDE OF CLINICIANS 21 (2d ed. 2000). Not all patients want this. 
See Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical 
Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 379, 419 (1990) (surveying evidence that “in many cases patients do 
request or allow physicians to make decisions for them” (footnote omitted)); see 
also infra note 166 and accompanying text (describing the “model of shared 
decision making” between patients and doctors as responding to the desire of 
some patients to provide input but not necessarily to make a decision on their 
own). 
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values and culture.149 As Justice Cardozo famously observed in 
1914, “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what shall be done with his body.”150 For much 
of our history, however, informed consent played little to no role 
in the doctor–patient relationship. In an era of paternalism, 
“simple consent” sufficed before a physician treated a patient.151 
Not surprisingly, “simple consent” sometimes amounted to no 
consent at all.152  
By the late 1950s, courts began to require meaningful 
consent by patients. In Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior 
                                                                                                     
 149. See BERG ET AL., supra note 148, at 14 (explaining that such values are 
“deeply embedded in American culture” and thus “[i]t is not surprising that 
informed consent is a cornerstone of contemporary medical ethics and health 
law in the United States”).  
 150. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914). 
 151. See BERG ET AL., supra note 149, at 43 (noting that historically “courts 
have generally agreed that the patient has, by speaking some phrase, 
authorized the physician to proceed and thereby provided the physician with a 
defense to an action for battery”). We refer to this as a “simple consent” 
requirement. Id. 
 152. See id. (noting that in early- to mid-twentieth-century cases courts 
often found consent even when patients had expressly told the doctor not to 
render treatment) (citing Markart v. Zeimer, 227 P. 683 (Cal. Ct. App. 1924); 
Meek v. City of Loveland, 276 Pac. 30 (Colo. 1929); Corn v. French, 289 P.2d 173 
(Nev. 1955)). 
As late as the 1950s, a Nevada trial court granted a defendant-doctor’s 
motion to dismiss even though the plaintiff-patient maintained that the doctor 
deliberately deceived her into consenting. See Corn, 289 P.2d at 281–82 (noting 
trial court’s grant of involuntary dismissal and plaintiff’s assignments of error). 
There, Ruth Corn visited Dr. James French about a lump under her right 
breast. Id. at 174–75. Suspecting breast cancer, Dr. French indicated that the 
breast may need to be removed and began making arrangements over the phone 
for a procedure at a hospital, including a request for particular tools. Id. Ruth 
immediately told Dr. French, “If that’s my breast you are talking about, you are 
not going to remove it.” Id. at 175. Doctor French responded, “I have no 
intentions of removing your breast. I wouldn’t think of doing so without first 
making a test,” explaining that the test required the same tools. Id. When Ruth 
arrived at the hospital for the procedure, she signed a form “giv[ing] [her] 
consent to James B. French, M.D., to perform an operation for mastectomy . . . 
upon [her], and to do whatever may be deemed necessary in his judgment.” Id. 
Ruth had never heard of a mastectomy and Dr. French never explained what 
mastectomy meant. Id. Ruth told Dr. French a second time that he only was to 
conduct a test. Dr. French removed Ruth’s breast anyway. Id. Although the 
Supreme Court of Nevada ultimately reversed the decision and remanded it for 
a new trial on a claim of negligence, id. at 182, the trial court’s decision 
exemplifies the historical resistance to imposing duties of informed consent.  
EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVES 1415 
University Board of Trustees,153 a California appellate court 
imposed on doctors an affirmative duty of honest and meaningful 
disclosure.154 Fleshing out the contours of informed consent, the 
Salgo court noted that “[a] physician violates his duty to his 
patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts 
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by 
the patient to the proposed treatment.”155 
A. Two Approaches to Informed Consent 
Today, as a result of judicial decisions or state legislation, all 
fifty states require physicians to secure informed consent.156 But 
states differ in how they determine what must be disclosed to 
patients.157 Under the earliest test, the professional standard, 
physicians must disclose only that “which a reasonable medical 
practitioner would [disclose] under the same or similar 
circumstances.”158 This standard offered physicians, as a group, 
the freedom to define appropriate disclosure based on medical 
knowledge,159 giving them considerable certainty about what 
needed to be disclosed.160 Clearly, the professional standard gives 
physician’s substantial control over what is disclosed and, 
                                                                                                     
 153. 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). 
 154. See id. at 181 (noting that despite this duty, the trial court’s jury 
instruction on the physician’s duty to disclose was “rather broad” and explaining 
the duty in detail). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed 
Consent: The Case for Shared Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 493 
(2006) (providing appendix of state laws and key cases). 
 157. See BERG ET AL., supra note 149, at 46–51 (discussing the differences 
between the “professional” and “patient-oriented” standards of informed 
consent). “[I]n practice the boundary between these two standards is often 
blurred.” Id. at 52.  
 158. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960). 
 159. See BERG ET AL., supra note 148, at 46 (recognizing the “maintenance of 
the medical profession’s freedom . . . to shape the contours of appropriate 
disclosure” as an advantage of the professional standard). 
 160. Id. at 46–47 (noting that “the professional standard places no extra 
burden on physicians to conform to an externally imposed standard, since they 
presumably already know about and observe professional norms,” but there may 
be instances in which no “professional custom of disclosing,” or an inadequate 
custom, exists).  
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therefore, over the ultimate decision whether to proceed with a 
treatment.161 Roughly half the states continue to follow this 
standard.162 
The more patient-centered material risk standard emerged to 
“safeguard the patient’s interest in achieving his own 
determination on treatment.”163 The material risk standard 
generally requires the physician “to disclose all information about 
a proposed treatment that a reasonable person in the patient’s 
circumstances would find material to a decision either to undergo 
or forgo treatment.”164 Although the material risk standard 
imposes a significantly greater burden on physicians,165 
“[i]ndividuals place different values on health, medical care, and 
risk,” preferences that “physicians cannot accurately predict.”166  
                                                                                                     
 161. See id. at 47 (“[E]ven where professional standards exist, they may be 
set too low to satisfy the needs of patients who wish to participate in medical 
decision making in accord with the idea of informed consent.”).  
 162. See David M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in Informed Consent 
Law: Two Standards for Disclosures of Treatment Risks, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 103, 105 (2007) (noting that “23 states have maintained the professional 
standard”). 
 163. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(explaining why the court declined to adopt a standard for disclosure “framed 
with reference to prevailing fashion within the medical profession” and instead 
defined the contours of what is disclosed by “the patient’s right of self-decision”). 
 164. BERG ET AL., supra note 149, at 48. A handful of jurisdictions “take an 
even more protective approach, requiring disclosure of information that a 
particular patient (as contrasted with a [reasonable] patient) would have 
wanted to make his or her decision.” HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 
204 (7th ed. 2007). Clearly, what the reasonable person finds material and what 
an individual patient finds material may differ. Berg offers the example of a 
watch repairer who would be interested in knowing that a particular medication 
can cause a fine tremor, a risk most patients may not find material. See BERG ET 
AL., supra note 149, at 50. 
 165. This is especially true when the law requires physicians to divine what 
individual patients would want to know. See Robert Gatter, Informed Consent 
and the Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 596 (2000) 
(arguing that “physicians [should] reasonably inquire about the subjective 
treatment goals of patients” and that “[w]ithout an objective limitation to a 
physician’s inquiry, physicians could be held liable for failing to ask the one 
question that, in hindsight, would have brought forth key information about the 
patient’s treatment goals”); see also LO, supra note 149, at 24 (discussing how 
problematic a subjective standard is in malpractice litigation). 
 166. Id. at 20. Over the last decade, healthcare professionals have embraced 
a model of shared decision making, which some describe as the “process of 
interacting with patients who wish to be involved in arriving at an informed, 
values-based choice among two or more medically reasonable alternatives.” 
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Under both standards for disclosure, patients must be 
informed of “the nature of the intervention, the expected benefits, 
the risks, and the likely consequences.”167 Under both, physicians 
have a duty to apprise patients of alternatives to treatment,168 as 
well as the risk of “doing nothing.”169 Under both, physicians are 
not absolved of a duty to discuss the risks of a medication with 
patients even if those risks are disclosed on a drug’s labeling. The 
drug’s label is intended for consumption by the physician, who 
must independently explain its importance to patients.170  
                                                                                                     
Annette O’Connor, Hilary A. Llewellyn-Thomas & Ann Barry Flood, Modifying 
Unwarranted Variations in Health Care: Shared Decision Making Using Patient 
Decision Aids, HEALTH AFFAIRS 63, 64 (2004), http://geiselmed.dartmouth.edu/ 
cfm/education/PDF/shared_decision_making.pdf. One impetus for the model is 
studies showing while that a significant number of patients (a fourth in one 
study) want physicians to make the decision for them, a significant majority, 
roughly one-half in one study and 68% in another, wanted to select the 
treatment option together with their physician. Deber RB, Kraetschmer N, 
Irvine J., What Role Do Patients Wish to Play in Treatment Decision-Making?, 
154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1414, 1414–20 (1996); see also Dennis J. Mazur & 
David H. Hickam, Patients’ Preferences for Risk Disclosure and Role in Decision 
Making for Invasive Medical Procedures, 12 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 114, 115 
(1997) (studying patient attitudes about the role they desire to have in medical 
decision-making). For a critique of shared decision making, arguing that “the 
skimpiest reflection reveals that [shared decision making] is ambiguous unto 
incoherence,” see Carl E. Schneider, Void for Vagueness, 37 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 
10, 10–11 (2007); see also Simon N. Whitney et al., Beyond Shared Decision 
Making: An Expanded Typology of Medical Decisions, 28 MED. DECISION MAKING 
699, 701–02 (2008) (discussing situations in which one viable treatment option 
exists and contrasting these with situations in which patients and doctors 
disagree about treatment options). 
 167. See LO, supra note 149, at 21 (laying out requirements for informed 
consent). 
 168. See generally John H. Derrick, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: 
Liability for Failure of Physician to Inform Patient of Alternative Modes of 
Diagnosis or Treatment, 38 A.L.R.4th 900 (originally published in 1985) 
(collecting and discussing physician liability for failing to disclose alternative 
methods of treatment to patients under both standards). 
 169. See Wecker v. Amend, 918 P.2d 658, 661 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) 
(concluding that a physician should inform a patient of the option of forgoing 
treatment “in situations where no treatment at all is a reasonably medically 
acceptable option” under the professional standard); Truman v. Thomas, 611 
P.2d 902, 906–07 (Cal. 1980) (explaining that “if the recommended test or 
treatment is itself risky, then the physician should always explain the potential 
consequences of declining to follow the recommended course of action” since it 
would be material to a reasonable patient). 
 170. See Niemiera ex rel. Niemiera v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1119 (N.J. 
1989) (holding a prescription drug maker did not owe a duty to warn of side-
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Under both, physicians must disclose not only “biomedical 
risks” but “psychosocial” harms as well.171 Indeed, sometimes the 
psychosocial harms are the ones that matter most. As the medical 
ethicist Bernard Lo notes: “[For HIV] and genetic testing, the 
pertinent risks are not the risks of venipuncture, but the risks of 
stigma and discrimination in employment or health insurance. 
Many states have enacted special provisions requiring written 
informed consent and pretest counseling for HIV testing.”172 
Neither standard, however, requires physicians to inform patients 
of things that patients already know or reasonably should know.173 
                                                                                                     
effects because of the “learned intermediary” doctrine and noting that “[t]he 
duty of the manufacturer of the vaccine is to warn the learned intermediary who 
passes it on to the patient through informed consent” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 171. See LO, supra note 148, at 21 (explaining the types of information 
physicians must discuss with patients to obtain informed consent). Some 
question whether the information provided to women, or all patients, should be 
limited to medical information. For example, family practitioners might choose 
to disclose to women risks to their children from cohabiting with someone other 
than the child’s legal parent. For a discussion of risks to children cohabiting 
with mother’s boyfriends, in particular, see generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, 
Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s Treatment of De 
Facto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103 (2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson, 
Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, in 
RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN LAW 
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPALS OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 90 (Robin Fretwell 
Wilson ed., 2006); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk: The Sexual 
Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REVIEW 251 
(2001). 
 172. LO, supra note 148, at 21 (citation omitted). 
 173. Physicians may also be excused “from a duty to disclose information 
concerning dangers related to proposed treatment of which patients of average 
sophistication would already be aware, apparently without a requirement that 
any given patient actually be ‘of average sophistication.’” Jones, supra note 148, 
393–94 (quoting Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). Five 
general exceptions exist to the duty to provide informed consent: “threats to 
public health, medical emergency, therapeutic privilege, waiver of informed 
consent by the patient, and a patient’s lack of competence to make decisions.” 
THOMAS MAY, BIOETHICS IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY: THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF 
BIOETHICS DECISION MAKING 21 (paperback ed. 2009). Today, the therapeutic 
privilege has fallen into disfavor as too easily leveraged to “overrid[e] a patient’s 
values.” Id. at 21–22, 26–30 (explaining how the therapeutic privilege was relied 
upon to preclude disclosure of alternative treatments to patients who would 
rather let the doctor decide); see also Nathan A. Bostick, Robert Sade, John W. 
McMahon & Regina Benjamin, Report of the American Medical Association 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs: Withholding Information from Patients: 
Rethinking the Propriety of “Therapeutic Privilege,” 17 THE J. OF CLINICAL 
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In short, then, “all risks potentially affecting the decision must be 
unmasked.”174  
B. Abortion Cases 
A pair of recent cases brought by women after abortions they 
later regretted affirms that, under both standards, patients must 
be informed about factual information like gestational stage.  
In the past few years, state courts in New Jersey and Illinois 
have grappled with the limits of disclosure provided to women 
seeking an abortion. In both, the plaintiffs lost.175 The plaintiffs 
maintained—in virtually identical terms176—that they should 
                                                                                                     
ETHICS 302 (2006) (concluding that withholding information is unethical and 
early communication should only be avoided if early communication is “clearly 
contraindicated”). 
 174. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnote 
omitted). Of course, disclosure does not always work this way on the ground. See 
BERG ET AL., supra note 148, at 147 (noting that some proponents of informed 
consent “are troubled by the failure of the current law to protect [patient] 
autonomy as fully as it might and by what they see as a consistent pattern of 
subordinating patient autonomy to the interests of the medical profession” 
(endnotes omitted)).  
 175. See Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 574 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2011) (affirming lower court’s dismissal of complaint that included 
claim for lack of informed consent); Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 428 (N.J. 
2007) (“We . . . reinstate the order dismissing plaintiff’s lack-of-informed-consent 
and emotional distress claims, which were the only remaining claims in this 
case.”). 
To succeed on a claim of a breach of the duty to provide informed consent, 
plaintiffs must demonstrate three elements: failure to disclose a specific risk in 
violation of the applicable standard, the materialization of the specific risk, and 
that had the risk been disclosed, the patient, or a prudent person in the 
patient’s position, would not have proceeded as she did. See HALL ET AL, supra 
note 164, at 215 (laying out elements of a cause of action for nondisclosure).  
On causation, the dominant standard is the prudent person standard, but a 
handful of jurisdictions follow a subjective standard. Compare Canterbury, 464 
F.2d at 791 (establishing the objective “reasonable person” test for causation 
and noting that “[t]he [particular] patient’s testimony is relevant on that score 
of course but it would not threaten to dominate the findings”), with Scott v. 
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979) (rejecting the Canterbury “‘reasonable 
man’ standard” and opting instead for a test that places significant weight on 
the testimony of the particular patient). 
 176. The striking parallels between the plaintiffs’ complaints are not 
surprising because both cases were brought by the same counsel. See Doe, 956 
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have been told the procedure would terminate a “complete, 
separate, unique and irreplaceable human being,” and so would 
“kill[] an existing human being.”177  
In Acuna v. Turkish,178 the court accepted as true the 
plaintiff’s allegations that she had asked whether it was a “baby 
in there.”179 In Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chicago Area,180 
plaintiff alleged she asked if a “life of a human being in the 
biological sense” would be terminated.181 In both, the patients 
said the provider assured them that no life was at stake. In 
Acuna, the doctor allegedly said “don’t be stupid, its only 
blood,”182 and in Doe, plaintiff alleged Planned Parenthood’s 
counselor told her that “an abortion did not terminate the life of a 
human being.”183 Both later learned, as Acuna says in her words, 
that there “‘was a baby and not just blood’ inside of her.”184 Both 
wanted to be told far more than they say they were—in extremely 
explicit terms. Acuna claimed that the physician failed to inform 
her that “[Andres] Acuna [(The name she gave to her terminated 
“child”)], although a person unborn, was a complete, separate, 
unique[,] and irreplaceable human being.”185 Doe charged that 
                                                                                                     
N.E.2d at 571 (“The remarkable similarity with the instant case may be 
explained by the statement at oral argument of plaintiff’s counsel that he 
represented Acuna before the New Jersey Supreme Court.”)  
 177. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 418 (internal quotations omitted). 
 178. 930 A.2d 416 (N.J. 2007). 
 179. Id. at 419. 
 180. 956 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). 
 181. Id. at 567. 
 182. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 419. “Defendant could not recall how he responded 
but believes he likely would have told her that a ‘seven-week pregnancy is not a 
living human being,’ but rather it ‘is just tissue at this time.’” Id. 
 183. Doe, 956 N.E.2d at 567. It is unclear whether the defendant disputes 
this allegation. See id. (accepting the plaintiff’s facts as true). The plaintiff 
further contended “the defendants had a duty to inform her there is a greater 
risk of death, depression, suicide and breast cancer in women who undergo an 
abortion than in those who give birth.” Id. 
 184. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 419 (N.J. 2007). Acuna says that after 
experiencing vaginal bleeding as the result of “incomplete abortion,” a nurse told 
her that “the doctor had left parts of the baby inside of her.” Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
 185. Id. at 420. Acuna also claimed the physician failed to inform her that 
. . . (2) there existed the potential risk that Andres “was capable of 
experiencing pain” at eight weeks gestation; (3) abortion involved 
“actually killing an existing human being”; (4) she would be at risk of 
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Planned Parenthood failed to “inform her that an abortion 
‘procedure would terminate the life of a second patient, a living 
human being as a matter of biological fact.’”186  
Both courts made short work of the duty to be so explicit. In 
Acuna, the court first noted that the plaintiff “must demonstrate 
that a physician withheld medical information that a reasonably 
prudent pregnant woman in like circumstances would have 
considered material before consenting to a termination of 
pregnancy.”187 
The court held it would “not place a duty on doctors when 
there is no consensus in the medical community or among the 
public supporting plaintiff’s assertions.”188 Indeed, “the 
knowledge that plaintiff sought from defendant cannot be 
compelled from a doctor who may have a different scientific, 
moral, or philosophical viewpoint on the issue of when life 
begins.”189 The court refused to use “the engine of the common 
law” to “drive public policy in one particular direction” on an 
issue on which there is a “deep societal and philosophical divide:” 
“the profound issue of when life begins.”190 The common law 
requires that physicians “provide their pregnant patients seeking 
an abortion only with material medical information, including 
gestational stage and medical risks.”191 
Evaluating Planned Parenthood’s disclosures by “that of the 
reasonable physician,”192 the Doe court also rejected the patient’s 
                                                                                                     
suffering from “post-abortion syndrome,” a form of a post-traumatic 
stress disorder; and (5) she would come to realize that she “was 
responsible for killing her own child” and bear a weight of guilt for 
the rest of her life. 
Id. 
 186. Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 567 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011).  
 187. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 425 (citation omitted). 
 188. Id. at 428. 
 189. Id. The defendant and amici argued: “[M]andating that a physician 
express a non-medical and value-laden viewpoint conflicting with the 
physician’s own strongly held personal and moral beliefs violates his First 
Amendment right to the exercise of free—not coerced—speech.” Id. 
 190. Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 427 (N.J. 2007). 
 191. Id. at 427–28. 
 192. Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E.2d 564, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2011) (citing Weekly v. Solomon, 510 N.E.2d 152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)). 
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informed consent claim.193 It cited the Acuna court’s description 
of the common law with approval, namely that it “requires 
doctors to provide their pregnant patients seeking an abortion 
only with material medical information, including gestational 
stage and medical risks involved in the procedure.”194 It added 
that “[n]o court, regardless of where it sits, has found a common 
law duty requiring doctors to tell their pregnant patients that 
aborting an embryo, or fetus, is the killing of an existing human 
being.”195 The court then rejected the “plaintiff’s claims that the 
defendants owed her disclosures under Illinois common law that 
reflected something other than the scientific, moral, or 
philosophical viewpoint of Planned Parenthood as an abortion 
clinic.”196 
C. The Disclosure Owed to Women  
As these cases illustrate, a sensible line can be drawn 
between disclosure of factual medical information that would be 
material to the prudent patient, as the Acuna court did, and 
weighing in on the ultimate issue of when life begins. In this 
context, doctors owe women factual disclosures faithful to the 
science around EC. Physicians should give each woman specific, 
fact-based information on when a given form of EC likely works 
(pre-fertilization, post-fertilization but pre-implantation, or 
during implantation) so that she can make decisions based on her 
own views of when life begins—or whether that question even 
matters to her. 
The juncture at which EC works is material to many 
patients. Ordinary women care deeply about how EC functions. 
Likewise, medical providers—from family practitioners and 
members of the FDA scientific panel to academic researchers and 
women’s health educators—recognize that women should be told 
far more than they are told now.197 The need for factual 
                                                                                                     
 193. See id. at 573 (“Illinois common law does not compel the disclosures the 
plaintiff claims should have been made to her . . . .”). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. at 572 (citing Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 418 (N.J. 2007)). 
 196. Id. at 573. 
 197. Supra Part IV. 
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information is especially compelling because many women labor 
under misconceptions about how EC functions. Without better 
information, some women will make choices that may 
“inadvertently violat[e] their own religious or moral values.”198  
Of equal force is the fact that some women will choose not to 
use EC,199 believing all forms of EC work after fertilization—
when, for Plan B, that is highly unlikely. In one study of “never-
users” of EC in Canada, researchers found that “[n]ever-users 
who had believed [EC] to be an abortifacient said that they would 
be more likely to consider using it, if the need arose, now that 
they understood how it functions.”200 
Nonetheless, concerns about compelled speech need to be 
taken seriously. Doctors cannot—and should not—be compelled 
to express an ultimate conclusion about whether “pregnancy” or 
“life” begins at one junction or another. Conversely, doctors 
should not be asked to express an opinion on the ultimate 
decision of whether a given drug acts as an “abortifacient.” As the 
Acuna court noted, “it would be bad public policy, and probably 
unconstitutional, under the banner of the law of informed 
consent, to compel obstetricians to voice plaintiff’s non-medical 
and ideologically-driven viewpoint in the ongoing debate on 
abortion.”201 Both courts made clear, however, that factual, 
scientific disclosure required by the duty to provide informed 
consent does comport with the First Amendment.  
D. Practical Considerations 
                                                                                                     
 198. Lockwood, supra note 19, at 15. 
 199. Gemzell-Danielsson, Berger & Lalitkumar, supra note 56, at 300 
(arguing that “an increased knowledge about the mechanisms of action and 
safety of EC is essential for the development of new methods as well as for 
optimizing the use of those already available”). “This knowledge may also 
influence individual and cultural acceptability of EC use.” Id. Another article 
argues that in order “[t]o make an informed choice, women must know that 
[EC] . . . prevent[s] pregnancy primarily by delaying or inhibiting ovulation and 
inhibiting fertilization.” Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 7.  
 200. Jean Shoveller et al., Identifying Barriers to Emergency Contraception 
Use Among Young Women from Various Sociocultural Groups in British 
Columbia, Canada, 39 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 13, 16 (2007). 
 201. Acuna, 930 A.2d at 424. 
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The aspiration for informed consent, as guidance to federal 
family planning agencies under Title X encapsulates the duty, is 
to have “individualized dialogue[s] with a client.”202 In the fast-
paced medical practices of today, physicians sometimes see 
informed consent as a “nuisance.” The impulse may be to deal 
with it “in relatively mechanical ways, such as making sure 
patients sign consent forms before major procedures.”203  
Paper consent is not likely to advance women’s 
understanding.204 As many have recognized, patients are no more 
likely to read long consent forms than they are to read the FDA 
insert. And unless explained in more accessible, nonspecialized 
terms, patients are no more likely to understand the content of a 
consent form without a physician’s guidance than they are the 
FDA label.  
True, providing informed consent is not without costs.205 
Doctors face enormous time constraints in daily practice.206 
                                                                                                     
 202. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PROGRAM GUIDELINES FOR 
PROJECT GRANTS FOR FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES 18 (2001), http://www.hhs. 
gov/opa/pdfs/2001-ofp-guidelines-complete.pdf. 
 203. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL 
ETHICS (3d ed. 1989). 
 204. A rich literature exists on the failings of paper consent. See e.g., Carl E. 
Schneider, Void for Vagueness, HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 11 (2007) (“The long-
standing principle—informed consent—is administratively practical but a paper 
tiger.”). 
 205. See Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 
904 (1994) (footnotes omitted)  
The realists—primarily practicing physicians—harbor a different 
vision of informed consent. Although they emphatically do not contest 
the principle and goals of informed consent, they do question whether 
most patients really desire the kind of dialogue that the idealists 
propose. They also question whether, whatever patients desire, the 
gains in patient autonomy and improved outcomes produced by the 
dialogue are worth the additional time, money, and needless patient 
anxiety and confusion that informed consent may entail. 
 206. See generally Andrew Gottschalk & Susan A. Flocke, Time Spent in 
Face-to-Face Patient Care and Work Outside the Examination Room, 3 ANNALS 
FAM. MED. 488 (2005); David Mechanic, Physician Discontent Challenges and 
Opportunities, 7 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 941 (2003); Jerome P. Kassirer, Doctor 
Discontent, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1543 (1998).  
For example, as of 1997, 41% of physicians reported a decrease in the 
amount of time devoted to face-time with patients. KAREN SCOTT COLLINS, CATHY 
SCHOEN & DAVID R. SANDMAN, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE COMMONWEALTH 
FUND SURVEY OF PHYSICIAN EXPERIENCES WITH MANAGED CARE 5 (1997). While 
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Mounting administrative responsibilities tied to navigating 
payment by insurers, like authorization requests and utilization 
review, take time away from interaction with patients.207 
Moreover, keeping up with the dense literature on mechanisms of 
action of various forms of EC takes time, and demystifying it for 
patients will take more time. In the best of circumstances, 
patients often do not understand what a physician means.208  
Here, easy-to-follow summaries by the Cleveland Clinic and 
others can facilitate these conversations, making conversations 
less taxing for all. Doctors need only give a snapshot of the 
literature drawn from quick summaries of the maturing evidence 
about how Plan B and ella work.209  
                                                                                                     
many say that “visit rates above three to four per hour are associated with 
suboptimal visit content,” in the U.S., visit lengths were “10 to 20 minutes or 
more” in 1999, and are likely more crunched today. See David C. Dugdale, 
Ronald Epstein & Steven Z. Pantilat, Time and the Patient-Physician 
Relationship, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S34, S34 (1999) (“[I]n Great Britain, 
average visit lengths for general practitioners are between 5 and 8 minutes, 
whereas in the United States and Sweden, they are 10 to 20 minutes or more.”). 
 207. See David C. Dugdale, Ronald Epstein & Steven Z. Pantilat, Time and 
the Patient-Physician Relationship, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. S34, S34 (1999) 
(“[P]hysicians face mounting demands on their time. Increasing administrative 
requirements for health care delivery (e.g., service and authorization requests, 
utilization review processes) encroach on time spent with patients.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Pauline W. Chen, Do You Know What Your Doctor Is Talking 
About?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/health/ 
02chen.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014) (discussing the problems presented by 
patients’ lack of health literacy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated 
Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 651 (2013) (arguing that “mandated 
disclosure . . . chronically fails to accomplish its purpose” of enlightening 
patients so that they can participate meaningfully in decision-making processes 
with professionals). 
 209. Physicians’ prescribing of EC to patients may change with updated 
information, as well. Some physicians hesitate to prescribe EC on religious 
grounds. See Jennifer L. Wallace et al., Emergency Contraception: Knowledge 
and Attitudes of Family Providers, 36 FAM. MED. 417, 421 (2004) (identifying a 
“subset of physicians who would not prescribe under any circumstance . . . 
[because of] feeling uncomfortable with EC secondary to religious/ethical 
beliefs”). This reluctance may be allayed as to Plan B with better information. 
See supra Part III.A.1 (discussing how Plan B works). Citing a “lack of 
knowledge,” physicians are understandably hesitant to prescribe to adolescents. 
Neville H. Golden et al., Emergency Contraception: Pediatricians’ Knowledge, 
Attitudes, and Opinions, 107 PEDIATRICS 287, 291 (2001). In 2001, “most 
pediatricians did not feel comfortable prescribing EC and cited lack of 
knowledge as the main concern for lack of comfort,” although this may have 
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Physicians do have to “remember[] to discuss EC during 
routine visits,” which is not the easiest thing to do in a crush of 
patients and is “one of the most significant barriers” to EC use.210 
To some extent, operationalizing informed consent falls not solely 
on the doctor but can be facilitated by good practices and good 
office staff. Videos and print brochures can introduce the patient 
to the needed information, supplementing the interactions 
between doctor and patient. Perhaps more for this topic than 
most, a visual will go a long way towards illuminating the 
junctures at which a particular form of EC may work—whether 
(a) before fertilization, (b) after fertilization and before 
implantation, or (c) during implantation. A visual would also 
assist a woman who did not already have a set notion about when 
pregnancy begins to decide, for herself, among competing medical 
understandings. In studies of video consent, some patients better 
understand and are more satisfied with their treatments when 
medical professionals supplement their verbal interaction with 
audio-visual aids.211  
                                                                                                     
changed. Id.  
Twelve percent cited moral or religious reasons and [seventeen 
percent] were concerned about teratogenic effects. There were no 
differences in comfort level based on age, gender, or practice type. 
Twenty-two percent of respondents believed that providing EC 
encourages adolescent risk-taking behavior and 52.4% would restrict 
the number of times they would dispense EC to an individual 
[adolescent] patient.  
Id. at 287. Better information may again allay physician concerns, an important 
benefit since girls need this information as much as women—or perhaps even 
more. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 131, at 20–24 (discussing teen 
pregnancy and life chances). 
 210. See Wallace et al., supra note 209, at 421 (discussing “[b]arriers to EC 
use identified by physicians”). 
 211. See Michael Migden, Arianne Chavez-Frazier & Tri Nguyen, The Use of 
High Definition Video Modules for Delivery of Informed Consent and Wound 
Care Education in the Mohs Surgery Unit, 27 SEMINARS CUTANEOUS MED. & 
SURGERY 89, 92 (2008) (“Increased patient understanding was demonstrated in 
our assessment of the wound care video group, with patients scoring 91.6% on 
the multiple-choice quiz compared with a score of 84% in the group with only 
nurse demonstration of wound care.”); E. Tompsett, R. Afifi & S. Tawfeek, Can 
Video Aids Increase the Validity of Patient Consent, 32 J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNAECOLOGY, 680, 680–82 (2012) (offering evidence that patient understanding 
of methods and purpose of treatment was significantly enhanced by using 
videos). 
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Some states provide legal safe harbor protections that 
immunize physicians who follow “stock” disclosures about the 
risks of a particular treatment, an approach that could be used 
here to reduce the transaction costs of providing informed consent 
(as well as liability risks). Texas provides one example of such a 
safe harbor protection.212 Texas physicians may use off-the-rack 
disclosure forms to provide information to patients about risks 
inherent in particular procedures.213 One form is very general and 
may be adapted to any procedure.214 Other forms have been 
developed for specific procedures, listing their particular risks 
and unique concerns.215 The patient signs the form prior to 
undergoing treatment. The patient’s signature triggers a legal 
presumption that the duty of informed consent was satisfied.216 
The form supplements, but does not replace, the discussion that 
must occur between physician and patient to otherwise fulfill the 
doctor’s disclosure obligations.217 
The safe harbor approach, like good office procedures, can 
significantly reduce the burden on physicians of meeting their 
legal duties to empower women to decide for themselves. 
VI. Conclusion 
Like so much of the country’s continuing clash over abortion, 
the dispute over whether Plan B and ella act as ordinary 
contraceptives, before fertilization—or whether they “violate[] the 
                                                                                                     
 212. For a general discussion of Texas’s safe harbor protections, see 
generally Informed Consent, TEXAS MED. ASS’N (Feb. 2012), http://www. 
texmed.org/Template.aspx?id=6049#Proper (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 213. See id. (explaining how and when disclosure forms are used); see also 22 
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 165.6 (2014); 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 601.4, 601.5, 601.7, 
601.8, 601.9 (2014) (discussing consents and disclosures required in various 
procedures). 
 214. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 601.4, 601.5, 601.7. 
 215. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 165.6; see also 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 601.4, 
601.5, 601.7, 601.8, 601.9 (discussing consents and disclosures required in 
various procedures). 
 216. See Informed Consent, supra note 212 (stating that once risks are 
disclosed and consent is given, a legal presumption is established). 
 217. Id. 
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Commandment against murder”218—generates more heat than 
light. 
Clearly, “women should be informed that the best available 
evidence is that the ability of [both to] prevent pregnancy can be 
fully accounted for by mechanisms that do not involve 
interference with post-fertilization events.”219 While hundreds of 
studies over fifteen years demonstrate that the chances that Plan 
B ever acts after fertilization are vanishingly small, the same 
cannot be said of ella.  
While many women have no moral qualms about using EC, 
whether it acts before or after fertilization, others do. For them, 
the fact that a drug may act after fertilization means that it is 
morally off limits. Equipping women with the factual information 
necessary for them to make their own moral judgments falls 
squarely within the commitment we have made to patients in 
matters affecting their bodies and health: patients decide.  
                                                                                                     
 218. Complaint at 10, Geneva Coll. v. Sebelius, 929 F. Supp. 2d 402 (W.D. 
Penn. 2013) (No. 2:12-cv-00207). 
 219. Trussell, Raymond & Cleland, supra note 73, at 7. 
